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ABSTRACT Since socialist Vietnam embraced a market economy in the mid-1980s, high population mobility has
engendered shifting forms of insecurity in rural livelihoods and family lives. This article discusses how migrant
households in a Red River Delta rural district draw on institutions of care beyond family and kinship to deal with
such insecurity. These institutions simultaneously respond to local people’s changing needs and aspirations, and
attempt to exert social and moral control. I show the increasing conditionality and commodification in the
entitlements they provide and the differential ability of migrant households in accessing them. These rationalities
are constitutive of the changing ways in which the institutions exert moral authority.
Introduction
The sudden death of a 33-year-old woman in Spring District1 was one of the most tragic events that
took place during my fieldwork in 2011–2012. Thanh, mother of two children, had been working in
Hanoi as a junk trader for years until she fell from the stairs of a house under construction, having
bought some used material from the owner of the house. Severe head injury led to her death four days
later, ending her emergency treatment at a daily cost of 10 million VND2 (about 500 USD). Almost
every household in the village made a funeral gift of 100–200,000 VND; as my host said to me, ‘now
that they are in such dire circumstances, we must come to lend3 them some money so that they can
cover the costs’. Days after Thanh’s funeral, there was a village meeting to assess which households
can be formally classified as poor to receive state support and subsidies for the coming year. A strong
case was made for her surviving husband and children by the village head and Mr Hoa, a wealthy
elderly man, that hard times were awaiting them now that the father had to raise his children single-
handedly, with mounting debts from the hospital and funeral costs. At the meeting, two female guests
were introduced by the village head as salespersons for the life insurance company Prudential, who
presented the company’s policies. Later I learned that the village head, an uncle of Thanh’s husband,
had approached them to explore the possibilities of signing Thanh up for a policy after her accident.
What happened to Thanh and her family was not a common occurrence. It is, however, indicative of
the insecurity of migrant livelihoods and family life in the post-reform economy. Their responses to the
sudden turn of misfortune are also typical of how rural households draw on a variety of local
institutions and kinship-based networks of support to deal with them.
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Following four decades of state socialism, Vietnam officially embraced a market economy in the
mid-1980s, retaining its one-party political system and certain features of the socialist state, a system
now commonly referred to as market socialism. Since the reform (đổi mới), millions of peasants like
Thanh migrated from rural to urban areas to engage in urban employment. As elsewhere, labour
migration is not only a response to shifts in post-reform social provisions, but has itself become an
institution through which rural people seek to secure their livelihoods and care (Nguyen & Locke,
2014). The increasing normalisation of mobility requires rural households’ continuing adaptation, as
shown in recent studies on internal migration (Locke, Nguyen & Nguyen, 2014; Resurreccion & Hà,
2007; Thao & Agergaard, 2012). While these studies highlight rural migrants’ lack of access to urban
services and entitlements, they overlook the relationship between migrant households and rurally
based institutions, tending to assume that care is confined to family and kinship. Although kin
relations are central to household care organisation (Nguyen, 2014), this article demonstrates that
migrant households also draw on institutions beyond family and kinship to meet their care needs and
deal with the insecurity of mobile household reproduction.
As in China, care and welfare in Vietnam have been significantly reconfigured since reform
(Nguyen & Chen, 2014). This changing institutional context, while differing from state socialist
welfare, does not support the common thesis of state withdrawal. Rather, it suggests the state’s
shifting governing approach, competing claims for moral authority by diverse welfare actors, and
new local conceptions of needs and aspirations. Although some emerged after the reform, most of
the institutions are not new, yet their post-reform practices reveal an emerging hybridity between
socialist legacies and market logics. As we shall see, the care provided by state, market and civic
institutions is increasingly conditional and commodified. Conditionality and commodification are
often premised on moral ideas of the self, the family and the community that both dwell on the
socialist ethos of social cohesion and the neo-liberal emphasis on self-responsibility (O’Malley,
2004). I argue that these moral justifications help these institutions to exert moral authority in the
new economy, as their operations are entangled through kinship networks and familial discourses
to produce differentiated forms of care provision.
This article is primarily based on ethnographic data collected between July 2011 and July 2012
in two neighbouring communes of Spring District,4 which I shall call Red Spring and Green
Spring. Spring District is situated in Vietnam’s Red River Delta, about 130 km from the capital
city of Hanoi. The district has 19 communes with a total population of 180,000. Red Spring is the
largest commune with 19,000 inhabitants, and Green Spring has more than 7,000. Red Spring is
home to a number of important regional Catholic churches and famous Buddhist pagodas; about a
fifth of its population is Catholic. The population of Green Spring is primarily Buddhist. During
the fieldwork, I stayed with one household in each commune and interacted with neighbours,
relatives and local cadres. In Hanoi, I visited people from the district in their lodgings or work
places. Travelling between the district and Hanoi, I also talked to numerous migrants on the buses
operating between the two sites.
The household is the unit of analysis for several reasons. Despite the differential power positions
and interests of members (Nguyen, 2014), it remains a locus of joint actions and mutual support,
especially in times of need. Household members are bound by moral and legal obligations to provide
care for each other, and the project of sustaining household reproduction is a shared undertaking,
albeit often with varying outcomes for its members. Furthermore, focusing on the household as
analysis category is useful for examining contexts of rapid social change with a high degree of
informality and insecurity (Wallace, 2002) such as post-đổi mới Vietnam. It is also suitable to the
country’s institutional setting in which entitlements are distributed to households rather than to
individuals. Before dwelling on the analysis, I briefly discuss the linkage between care, social
security and migration, emphasising the multifaceted nature of household care organisation, espe-
cially in times of high mobility.
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Care, Migration, and (In)Security
In this article, care is understood as the labour, resources and relationships needed to ensure ‘the
mental, emotional and physical well-being of individuals’ (Parreñas, 2005, p. 12). There is growing
recognition that care is not restricted to the home and caring institutions; it cuts across public and
private spaces and a multilayer of institutions including the family, the market, the community and the
state (Kofman & Raghuram, 2009; Williams, 2010). Anthropological studies of post/late-socialist
contexts view care as part of social security (Benda-Beckmann, Benda-Beckmann, & Marks, 2000;
Kay, 2011; Read & Thelen, 2007), which encompasses purposive actions by individuals and groups to
deal with insecurity based on resources and relationships available to them. Social security relations,
they emphasise, are multiple, cross-cutting and constantly negotiated based on moral and legal
principles of need and obligation. As part of such relations, care ‘consists of practices that address
socially constructed needs’ (Read & Thelen, 2007, p. 7) with a giving and a receiving side (Benda-
Beckmann et al., 2000). Equally important is the linkage between the interpersonal and emotional
aspects of care and changing state policies and ideologies (Kay, 2012; Read & Thelen, 2007).
The care and migration literature has extensively analysed transnational movements of women from
poor countries into care work in wealthier countries and migrant labourers’ negotiations with caring
roles (Carling et al., 2012; Dreby, 2006; Parreñas, 2005). The privileging of the nuclear family and
kinship in this literature has, however, obscured the multifaceted process of care organisation beyond
kin-based networks, a process as complex for internal as for transnational migration. As a study on
internal migration in Malawi (Rohregger, 2006) suggests, migrant households draw on a shifting mix
of social relations, networks and institutions in both the city and the country for their livelihoods and
care. These include family, kinship and friendship, on the one hand, and state and non-state providers
of care, including religious networks, on the other, all of which are simultaneously sites of power
struggles and support.
Also little explored so far are the ways in which labour migration constitutes simultaneously a
mechanism of ensuring social security and a risk-producing venture that has repercussions for
household livelihoods and family life. Historically, insecurity is inherent in the human condition
across cultures, social classes and times (Arendt, 1998; Benda-Beckmann et al., 2000), only
shifting in forms and intensity depending on contexts. With wars, state intrusion into private life,
political repression and poverty, pre-mới đổi Vietnam hardly represented a period of security. Yet
changing material aspirations and rising social inequalities mean that the former political fear of
standing out in an egalitarian society has been replaced by the dread of losing out in a consumer
society dominated by logics of the market. Meanwhile, the greater privatisation of social services
previously provided as citizen entitlements has generated an insecurity of access for many. Migrant
labour, often attracted into the growing urban service sector and industrial centres, is increasingly
subjected to precarious conditions of life and work, which are underpinned by their marginal urban
citizenship (Nguyen & Locke, 2014). For migrant households in Spring District, the insecurity is
accentuated by their engagement in the risky urban waste trade (Nguyen, in press). As we shall see,
their recourse to rurally based institutions of care is often both an effect and an essential part of
household strategies to deal with the insecurity of migrant livelihoods. These strategies indicate
pragmatism while reproducing moral ideas that both facilitate the state’s developmental agenda and
its attempt to sustain moral authority.
Migrant Livelihoods and Care in Spring District
Due to high population density, labour migration has been an enduring feature of local livelihoods
since colonial times (1884–1945). This continued, albeit on a smaller scale, during state socialism,
despite the state’s strict regulation of population mobility (Hardy, 2005). The two successive wars
during this period also meant that many adult men and women were mobilised for extended periods. In
Spring District, there are now two distinct flows of migrants, for waged labour and for higher
education. The educational migrants largely originate from the township centres, where local officials
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and cadres are concentrated; most of them aim to find professional opportunities in Hanoi or return to
work as government officials in the district.
Labour migrants from the district, the focus of this article, are predominantly engaged in waste
trading. Out of a niche that had historical roots in the waste trade dating to the colonial times, people
from the district have helped to develop an extensive recycling trade employing tens of thousands of
people in major cities (DiGregorio, 1994; Mitchell, 2008). The trade is now also practised as part of
rural networks from other localities within and beyond the Red River Delta. Local people mainly work
as itinerant junk traders, buying recyclable wastes from households, or operators of urban waste
depots. Itinerant junk trading is an individual activity predominantly performed by women, whereas
running a waste depot requires the pooling of labour, often by married couples (Nguyen, in press).
These different forms of waste work are central to household patterns of migration and care. Either the
woman leaves to work as an itinerant junk trader and her husband stays home or the married couple
migrates together to operate an urban waste depot, leaving their children with grandparents or other
relatives. Aside from shifting labour market conditions, such arrangements arise out of intra-household
negotiations embedded in power relations between genders and generations and members’ changing
care needs throughout their lifecycle (Nguyen, 2014).
Yet the need to reproduce the household across locations is also due to the precariousness of migrant
livelihoods. While the urban waste trade has enabled local people to make a living and to accumulate
wealth (Mitchell, 2009; Nguyen, in press), it is highly risky due to price fluctuations. Meanwhile,
urban waste work typically involves makeshift housing, unstable rental tenure and health risks
(Mitchell, 2008, 2009; Nguyen, in press). These are foregrounded by a construction of labour migrants
as unwelcome outsiders in the city (Karis, 2013; Nguyen, in press), partly infused by the formal
citizenship categorisation through the household registration system (hộ khẩu). Accordingly, indivi-
duals must be registered as members of a household at a particular location as the legal basis for their
access to political, civil and social entitlements. Without urban household registration, migrants cannot
obtain birth, marriage or death certificates, nor can they legally own a property or directly use public
health and education services in the city. Recent reforms of the household registration have relaxed the
conditions for urban registration, which, however, still requires significant financial resources or
documented long-term residence (Le, Tran, & Nguyen, 2011). Migrant access to urban services and
utilities remains restricted, albeit more so in Hanoi, especially through the introduction of the Capital
City Law in 2012, than in Ho Chi Minh City (UN, 2014). Labour migrants from Spring District must
therefore continually adjust their migration patterns in order to make use of rurally based institutions to
meet the shifting needs of members living in different locations. Before delving into these dynamics, I
discuss the ways in which the post-đổi mới state has redefined its welfare function and the changing
ways in which it wields moral authority.
Changing Landscape of Care and Social Security in Vietnam
Until the 1980s, the socialist state sought to coordinate productive and reproductive activities of the
household through rural agricultural cooperatives and urban work units based on which most rural
and urban people could access public services. Although rural and urban access was uneven
(London, 2011), universal education and health care were seen as major achievements of the
socialist state (Truong, 2007). Apart from national independence, the moral authority of the party-
state rested on being a caring state that brings social equality and welfare to its citizens as
improvements to their life under feudalism and colonialism. With the dissolution of collective
units following đổi mới, the household has resumed its autonomy in production and its position
as the main locus of ‘reproduction, consumption, and inheritance’ (Werner, 2009, p. 12). Care and
social security are now primarily the household’s responsibilities (Barbieri & Bélanger, 2009;
Truong, 2007).
Yet, rather than withdrawing from social provision, the Vietnamese state has also been rolling
out new forms of welfare (Mai, 2010), as does the state in other post/late-socialist countries
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(Jäppinen, Kulmala, & Saarinen, 2011; Read & Thelen, 2007). Given increasing social discontents
with the post-reform insecurity and dispossession (Jacobs, 2008; Taylor, 2014), it is ever more
imperative for the state to demonstrate care for citizens’ wellbeing and recognise their contribu-
tions to the nation. To replace universal welfare, anti-poverty programmes target the poorest,
especially in rural and remote areas, and disadvantaged groups such as orphans, childless elderly
people or disabled people. The legacies of past wars continue to be on the welfare agenda, for
example, through direct and indirect transfers to war invalids, family members of war martyrs, or
those who fought in regions sprayed with Agent Orange.5 Direct transfers range from 800,000 to
2,000,000 VND, while indirect transfers include tuition fees, heath insurance subsidies and other
social benefits. Between 5 and 7 per cent of the population are beneficiaries of these war-related
transfers (Evans et al., 2006).
In the meantime, education and health care are increasingly commercialised and privatised, with
divisive effects between the rich and the poor, rural and urban areas (Deolalikar, 2009; London,
2006). Public hospitals have been raising their fees continuously in recent years. Although state
spending on education has increased in the last decade, a wide range of private schooling options
has emerged (London, 2011), while fees and contributions proliferate at all levels. Costs of
education and health care now figure among the most significant household expenditures, espe-
cially in rural areas (Deolalikar, 2009; London, 2011). Pre-school education has been reincorpo-
rated into the formal educational system; yet, since public spending in pre-school education is
marginal (London, 2011), most public kindergartens operate on a user-fee basis with predomi-
nantly contract staff. Private childcare has become common, with services ranging from neigh-
bourhood nursery groups to kindergartens and nurseries with diverse qualities, especially in urban
areas. Meanwhile, major international insurance companies such as Prudential or Manulife have
licensed branches in Vietnam, competing with local companies such as Bao Viet, offering a range
of insurances and, most recently, private pension.
In the official discourse, welfare is to be ‘socialised’. ‘Socialisation’ is a literal translation of the
Vietnamese term xã hội hóa. Similar to the term ‘equitisation’ (cổ phần hóa) in the restructuring
of state enterprises, the euphemism wards off the contradictions between socialist ideologies of
social cohesion and growing privatisation. The term is also meant to emphasise the participation of
a wide spectrum of social actors in care and welfare provision. Following đổi mới, religious and
voluntary institutions have been participating in philanthropy to a greater degree (Dang, Kim,
Nghiem, Nguyen, & Phi, 2011; Sidel, 1997). In rural areas, local associations, such as same-
school, same-age or elderly Buddhist women groups, have become more active in mobilising for
social activities and support (Luong, 2005). State-sponsored mass organisations such as the
Women’s Union, whose roles had mainly been political mobilisation, are now more involved in
providing such services as micro credit (Truong, 2007). Local non-governmental organisations
have also been emerging alongside international NGOs. Yet, while those providing welfare to the
needy or peer-to-peer support are encouraged, rights-based and political reform initiatives remain
little tolerated (Bui, 2013). Rather than contradicting each other, the discourse of socialisation and
such selective endorsement of welfare-producing civic organisations operate seamlessly as part of
the post-reform governing approach referred to as ‘socialism from afar’ (Ong & Zhang, 2008).
This approach simultaneously allows private choice and retains the political hold of the party-state
(Ong & Zhang, 2008; Schwenkel & Leshkowich, 2012), while promoting self-reliance, voluntar-
ism and community processes as the moral basis for care provision.
As we shall see, how migrant households in Spring District draw on local institutions of care
suggests pragmatic choices that are shaped by the insecurity of migrant livelihoods and such
governing logics under market socialism. Yet their everyday practices also reconstitute the moral
authority of these institutions, which do not merely provide ‘access to material resources that
makes people feel secure, but a network of social relations to which they can appeal in times of
crisis and need’ (Read & Thelen, 2007, p. 6). They simultaneously foster belonging and sociality
and create new forms of social division, reinforcing the inferior citizen status of rural migrants.
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The Care of the State: Place-Based and Means-Tested Provision, Community Processes and
Practices of Belonging
As elsewhere in rural Vietnam, households in Spring District can access a range of locally available
care entitlements and services provided by the state or state-sponsored organisations. Yet, this access,
apart from official means-tested criteria or user-fees, is determined by daily negotiations that are
shaped by labour migration. In most cases, it is tied to people’s rural household registration. While this
might be not an issue for better-off households, it is necessary for many to maintain an active presence
in the countryside.
Child Care and Schooling
Sim and Thuc are a Catholic couple from Red Spring who share with two other female villagers a
makeshift lodging close to a Catholic church in central Hanoi, where most of their fellow villagers
reside. Both husband and wife are itinerant junk traders (Nguyen, in press). They have two children
aged four and six living in the country with Sim’s parents, who are also responsible for the two
children of Sim’s brother. To bring their children to the city is out of the question for them, given their
makeshift accommodation and the potential costs of finding either public or affordable private child-
care and schooling in central Hanoi. The grandmother, Duong, the main caregiver to the children,
commented that her children were lucky to be able to leave their children with her. Yet this
arrangement would not be possible without the local nursery and the school; the children go to school
or kindergarten from 7 am to 5 pm, Monday to Saturday. The teachers also offer after-school care at a
small cost. Duong said she dreaded the weekends and the school holidays, when all the children stay
home and require greater attention; providing meals for the children and coordinating their daily
hygiene needs were already exhausting for her.
The Red Spring kindergarten, where one of her grandchildren goes, is crowded; there are 30 to
35 children per teacher. It costs 200,000 VND per month, which the parents pay for alongside
food, clothing and other costs. This is a small sum compared to the costs of the low-quality private
childcare available to migrants in Hanoi, which is easily five or six times higher for worse
conditions. The rural nurseries are more spacious, having a safer surrounding environment, and
the teachers are trained, in contrast to the untrained child-minders in urban childcare facilities for
migrants. School tuition is supposedly free for primary education, but there are non-tuition costs
such as material and ‘school construction’ contributions, which amount to the same as paying for a
child in kindergarten. Although it constitutes a significant household expenditure, the payment
compares favourably to securing a private school or a place in a public school in Hanoi, which
requires large sums of bribes without the proper household registration. In Duong’s words, the
parents could be ‘reassured’ leaving their children with the grandparents thanks to the availability
of local childcare and schooling.
Yet, in Sim’s and Thuc’s plan, one of them will return when their children reach adolescence. Whilst
smaller children are supposedly ‘easily manageable’ with less-complicated needs, children from 10
onwards are perceived as ‘difficult to educate’; grandparents are supposedly not disciplining and savvy
enough to supervise them. The presence of at least one parent is therefore desirable, especially given
the prevalence of the so-called ‘social evils’ such as computer games and drug use, two of the biggest
parental worries. Not every parent can return when such needs arise, either because they operate an
urban waste depot that requires the presence of both husband and wife, or because the household
cannot afford to lose one income. The absence of parents for teenage children is strongly criticised by
local people, especially teachers and school managers, who commonly blame such absence for
adolescent problems. Yet migrant parents maintain regular contact with the class teachers and school
management through mobile phones. The kindergartens and the schools also reach out to migrant
parents in addition to face-to-face contact with the substitute carers; parents are informed of important
issues. Most migrant parents strive to cultivate a good relationship with class teachers through visits
and gifts on important events such as the Teachers’ Day or the Lunar New Year.
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Migrant couples who operate urban waste depots are more likely to bring their children along, often
after the latter have lived their early years in the countryside. Should they continue with higher
secondary education (Grade 10–12),6 they often have to return to the district after finishing lower
secondary school (ending with Grade 9). Whilst there exist more urban schooling options for migrant
children until Grade 9, including private schools and public schools in less-central districts, their
possibilities are limited at the higher secondary level. Urban public secondary schools are only
accessible to those with local urban household registration. Private secondary schools in the city,
meanwhile, are either more expensive or have lower performance standards than rural public schools.
While some better-off households are able to move their household registration to Hanoi so that their
children can pursue secondary education there, it is necessary for most migrant children to return to the
district for secondary schooling. In Green Spring commune, where more households operate urban
waste depots, the number of students at the secondary school far exceeds that in the lower-level
schools because of these returnees. Whether the children go to school locally or elsewhere, the district
education bureau keeps track of their progress for reporting purposes as long as their household is still
registered in the district.
Despite the recent reforms that allow for some inclusion of migrant children in urban facilities,
access to urban public childcare and school remains significantly dependent on the household
registration, or, in other words, conditional upon their citizen status. How migrant households in
Spring District secure care and schooling for their children highlight the consequences of a continuing
exclusionary urban citizenship and the insecurity of their migrant livelihoods. The following section
discusses another form of state care that migrant households draw on to deal with such insecurity,
which is also highly conditional.
Means-Tested Benefit: the Poor Household Status
As mentioned, Thanh’s surviving household was easily voted eligible for the Poor Household Status
for the coming year at the village meeting. In the same meeting, another case was put forward without
success. Mien’s husband had been hospitalised two weeks before, diagnosed with a severe liver
problem which everybody attributed to his excessive drinking. Mien had had to disrupt her junk
trading work in Hanoi to return and take care of her husband. Without a health insurance, his treatment
had cost them a significant chunk of their savings. Whenever I met Mien during those days, she would
complain how depressing it was that she was stuck at home without earning any income, and that her
husband’s conditions would never be back to normal. Mien had tried to lobby with the village head,
visiting him with a gift of fruits and cookies; the Poor Household Status, among other benefits, would
help cover a large part of their formal medical expenses through the free health insurance. In the other
villagers’ opinions, however, her household’s circumstances were not comparable to Thanh’s: Mien
could still carry on her migrant work while their eldest son was ‘doing good business’ (làm ăn được)
in Hanoi and should be able to support his parents. More importantly, his health problem was self-
inflicted rather than a misfortune, and thus deserved less sympathy; Mien’s household’s situation thus
was not perceived as deserving, despite her personal disagreement with the evaluation.
To be officially counted among the poorest in the village used to be source of stigma; nowadays it
has become a desirable entitlement for low-income households that comes with benefits such as free
health insurance, low-interest loans or housing support. The set quota defined by the local govern-
ment means that there is often a hidden process of competition among the relatively less-well-off
families. In the village, few households can be classified as poor according to the government’s low
benchmark,7 although cases of sudden illnesses like Mien’s husband or accidents like Thanh’s can
plunge the households into a financial crisis due to the medical costs. Elligible households must
fulfil certain criteria of deservingness, based first of all on the intensity of their economic difficulties
and shared understanding of needs. For example, the few elderly people without children are given
priority, whereas poorer households with many children are not considered, since their poverty is
deemed to be their fault (in line with the state’s population-planning rhetoric).8 Furthermore,
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successful applicants need the support of prestigious villagers and – most importantly – of local
leaders such as the village head or the local party head.
Thanh’s household had both the backing of relatives, who were local leaders, and of other villagers
because its circumstances had been induced by her migrant work, whose precarious nature is high-
lighted through her accident. Village conversations for days had been focused on the event, unan-
imously constructing Thanh as a female martyr who had sacrificed her life for her children and family.
People had been circulating stories about her not having had breakfast to save money and how she had
long desired to buy herself an áo dài (the traditional female costume) to wear at weddings but had
never done so. All these elements struck a cord with the villagers, especially the women, many of
whom were or had been migrant waste traders themselves. A respected elderly pensioner, Mr Hoa,
who had spoken up in support of Thanh’s case in the village meeting, later said to me: ‘You are
witnessing a prime example of the negative impacts of migration.’ In his speech on that day, he hinted
that Thanh’s death represents the price that the village had to pay for his fellow villagers’ ventures into
risky frontiers. In his opinion, Thanh had not only made sacrifices for her family, but her sacrifices
also exemplify those of the whole village, which therefore should help her surviving family.
Through such village negotiations, the poor household status is no longer merely a means-tested
state benefit; it has been transformed into a token of care by the village towards its needy members, of
which the latter have to prove their deservingness. Those who receive the benefit thus are not only
beneficiaries of the state, but also indebted to others in the village. Rather than appearing imposed
from the top down, the conditionality becomes imbued with the meanings of reciprocal relationships.
For the migrants, whose urban citizen status is marginal, their participation in such negotiations is a
confirmation of their rural citizenship, which is embedded in kinship and neighbourhood relations. Its
symbolic dimension is as important as the transfer of financial benefits. For outspoken villagers such
as Mr Hoa and the village head, who are wealthy and influential, it is a chance to solidify their social
status through their patronage of the needy. The transfer thus simultaneously reconfirms the moral
authority of the state as being caring and responsive, despite its abandonment of universal welfare
goals, and helps to strengthen existing moral economic ties within the rural village. Such symbolic and
political dimensions of care are further illustrated in the practices of local mass organisations.
Mass Organisations: the State in the Community
Mass organisations were created in socialist countries for purposes of popular mobilisation. While
such organisations remain instruments of the party-state, they have over time become part of the
complex village relations characteristic of northern Vietnamese villages. They constitute important
venues for sociality and community care that villagers actively maintain during migration.
At Thanh’s funeral, one could hear announcements for the arrival of the representatives of the
Women’s Union, the Youth Union (some of whose members had been helping with organising the
funeral), the Elderly Association, the Veteran’s Association and other local mass organisations. Each
group came with a bức trướng (an embroidered funeral flag) and 100,000 VND. Later I learnt that the
standard funeral package had previously included a garland plus the same amount of money, but
because of the increasing price of fresh flowers, they had settled for the less-expensive funeral flag,
taking into account the fixed amount to be paid out for such an occasion. When Mien’s husband
returned from the hospital, he also received visits by representatives of mass organisations, including
the Veteran’s Association, of which he was a member. They brought him a standard get-well gift
comprising one kilogramme of sugar and one can of condensed milk, desirable get-well gifts in the
centrally planned period, when they were highly valued and thought to be recuperative due to scarcity.
This gifting practice has long disappeared in urban areas but remains common in Spring District;
although now readily available, they still carry the previous meanings as gifts. The families of the ill
persons thus often receive more sugar bags and milk cans than they can ever use, having to sell them
to the village grocery. It has also become acceptable that the visitors give the cash equivalent of the
gift to the host.
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As elsewhere, visiting an ill person expresses care and respect for the person, recognising him or her
as part of a community or a social relationship. In Vietnam, failure to do so may even damage existing
relationships. The visits of the mass associations, however, are not merely a matter of maintaining
relationships − their visits represent a token of care by the state. Unlike the Poor Household Status, the
standard gifts from mass organisations have little financial significance; important are their symbolic
meanings. Most of the organisations operate on a member-fee basis, with members paying annual fees
and contributions for special events. Their leaders receive a small state allowance but work primarily
as volunteers. In recent years, most organisations, except for the Elderly Association and the Veteran’s
Association, have few members attending their regular meetings because of migration. Yet, most
labour migrants duly contribute their membership fees, even when they are absent for long periods,
and make a point of returning for yearly gatherings. The mass organisations, remaining active in their
state-assigned roles, are thus also part of the web of social relations through which people seek
belonging and communal care, especially for their mobile livelihoods. Conversely, since these
organisations are deeply embedded in village relations, they remain effective instruments for state
governance, especially in shaping the rural citizen attached to their home city despite their labour
mobility. As the next section reveals, such attachment and loyalty to the home place are further
fostered by the practices of local religious institutions, which exert considerable discipline and control
over their members as they provide care.
The Care of God and Buddha: Local Religious Institutions, Livelihoods Insecurity and Moral
Anxiety
Religious institutions provide the spiritual care that local people increasingly seek for their mobile
livelihoods and changing material aspirations. This section discusses how local churches and
pagodas promote their ritual services while exerting moral authority over the mobile populace.
The Buddhist pagoda is located in Green Spring commune, which is predominantly Buddhist, and
the Catholic churches are in Red Spring commune, where Catholics and Buddhists co-reside.9
The head monk in charge of the pagoda (the Venerable) jokingly made the following statement in
our meeting: ‘In this commune, 5 per cent of the population are Party members; the other 95 per cent
are under my control.’ The Venerable has a good local standing on account of his rank and his official
role in the central Buddhist Order. People see him for all important life matters, such as children’s
school performance, business, birth, sickness, marriage, death or the drug addiction of a family
member. Most migrants return to visit the pagoda regularly. They often come carrying trays loaded
with offerings of wine, beer cans, sweets and cakes, rice and chicken to pray for protection and luck
for their newly opened waste depots or newly purchased transport vehicles. Many bring their vehicles
to the pagoda for the Venerable to perform a blessing ritual. The Venerable commented that since they
‘started to go out’, local people have had greater demand for such rituals.
The Venerable seems adept at capitalising on this need for the wealth of his pagoda. The pagoda
offers a standard ritual for each lifecycle event. For instance, after the birth of a child, the family may
have a bán khoán ceremony (selling/handing over) to be conducted by the Venerable. Bán khoán is a
folklorist practice incorporated into Buddhist pagodas, where deified personas are worshipped along-
side Buddhist figures. Such deities are supposedly protectors of children, having the power to rectify
the ills caused by supernatural forces. It is commonly believed that young children’s problems with
health, behaviour and even school performance arise from their exposure to evil spirits or offended
gods due to their date of birth. Such children are considered ‘difficult to raise’ (khó nuôi) and should
be ritually ‘handed over’ to the pagoda through the bán khoán ceremony so that they receive
protection. In the district, many consider doing this even when the children do not display any obvious
problems. Fifty-seven-year-old Vân, who had had the ceremonies arranged for her three-year old
grandson, said to me, ‘sacredness arises when one worships, peacefulness is assured when one
observes the ritual’.10 She believes that once the boy is ‘handed over’ to the pagoda, the protection
will also extend to his family’s waste trading activities:
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My children are traders (người làm ăn) and they rely on luck to have a smooth business. If the
age of the children does not match the age of the parents, all sorts of bad fortunes and ill health
will befall us.11 Since my grandson’s age is not in harmony with his parents’, I told my children
that it was necessary to obtain the protection of the deities (các ngài che chở.)
Other lifecycle services offered by the pagoda include a ritual to ‘bring the soul of the deceased to the
pagoda’ (đưa vào chùa) to seek protection, which takes place 49 days after the person dies. Another
service on offer is the marriage ceremony (lễ giá thú cầu hôn, lễ hằng thuận), which used to be
uncommon but has recently become popular in urban areas. Such ceremonies have been positively
portrayed in the media as an indication of greater interest in the spiritual union between the married
couple, which is supposed to guard them against the likelihood of divorce.12 The ceremony has been
performed by the Venerable for a number of couples in the commune, who would have this in addition
to their regular weddings.
While these ritual services are not entirely new, their monetary costs are. Donations for such
ceremonies used to be voluntary (tùy tâm); nowadays, there is a price tag for each, which increases
according to the prices of market goods and services (theo thời giá). For example, a full bán khoán
ceremony is priced at 7 million VND (350 USD), including offerings of food, drinks and cash
donation. Therefore, only wealthy families can afford the costs single-handedly; others seek to share
the ceremony for several children of similar age. Given the increasing popularity of these rituals, the
pagoda’s revenues are significant, not including irregular donations by successful migrant traders.
Apart from individualised services, there are annual Buddhist festivities that draw large numbers of
people; migrants tend to return for such events. Regular gatherings, often on the first and the 15th day
of the lunar month, in which people pool money for a festive meal, are well attended by the local
elderly, especially elderly women, for whom they are an important source of sociality. Local people
often complain about the costs of pagoda services; some are critical of the Venerable’s business-
mindedness. However, the pagoda remains important, not only as a religious but also a social
institution through which they seek protection, sociality and recognition.
As influential as his pagoda is, however, the Venerable openly admires the Catholic churches for
their hold on the congregation, as he said:
The Catholics control people better than the communist party. At birth, people are already signed
up to the church through the baptism; then they have to learn and study the teachings of the
church all their lives. They have to confess all their sins to the priest and follow their priest’s
guidance. The Catholic Church has an easy time collecting donations for any major projects even
when the people are not so wealthy.
While this comment reveals his personal interest in moral control over the pagoda-goers, it portrays to
some extent the more institutionalised operations of the Catholic Church. Although the Vatican’s
appointment of Catholic bishops must be approved by the Vietnamese state, the Church is relatively
autonomous (Hansen, 2005). Unlike the pagoda whose main income originates from donations and
payments by pagoda-goers, the local churches derive their financial means from various sources. Apart
from contributions by local Catholics, they benefit from donations by overseas Catholics and revenues
from businesses such as drug stores and a bottled water facility.
The nuns and deacons in the local churches I interviewed all pointed out that the Church has a
structure of mass mobilisation parallel to that of the state. For instance, there are similar church
associations for small children, young people, women and elderly people through which different age
groups can be organised for religious activities and practical support. When a donation is to be made to
support common local causes, for instance, Catholic households are often approached by both the
mass organisations and the church associations. The Church has a standardised system of religious
teaching, and school children are sent to church classes every weekend, which, according to Sim and
Thuc, have the double benefit of religious education and childcare. Donations for church services are
not as itemised as at the pagoda, but they constitute a significant expenditure for a Catholic household.
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Apart from an orphanage, some churches offer child care services and basic health clinics, which are
free to local residents (except for food and medicine costs; Catholic households pay a small fee). Non-
Catholics use these church-provided services in a pragmatic manner; migrants like my female host
sometimes return from Hanoi to visit the church’s clinic for their basic health problems. Her brother,
who looks after four grandchildren, sent one of them to a Catholic nursery run by resident nuns. For
him, it was a convenient and low-cost option until the child goes to school; the Catholic nursery is
closer than the commune’s kindergarten, requiring less time for dropping off and picking up.
While the local churches’ out-reach services to non-Catholics may have to do with local prestige
and competition for moral authority, the care for their congregation goes hand in hand with control,
especially over the latter’s migration. According to Catholic informants, labour migration, especially
by married women, was in the early 1990s not favoured by the priests, whose disapproval, however,
has not prevented people from migrating for urban work. Nevertheless, young people in marriage age
who migrate need a referral letter from the local priest to register with a church at their destination to
continue their pre-marital religious education, which the Catholic informants sometimes compare to
the official household registration (hộ khẩu). Migrant Catholics are supposed to attend services in the
urban churches and confess to the priests there; therefore, most of them live in the vicinity of the urban
churches. The church I visited in Hanoi has a Committee for Migrant Catholics, which organises
religious activities and services for the migrants out of a concern that migration might erode the faith
of individuals (it does not provide any child care or health care, though). In a service for migrants I
attended, the priest expressed grave concerns about the declining attendance by migrant Catholics in
these services, urging them to pay more attention to their faith.
In differing manners, the local Buddhist pagoda and Catholic churches seek to exercise moral
control and authority on their followers and others, as they offer the care and protection that the latter
seek for their migrant livelihoods and family lives. The commodification of ritual services provided by
the pagoda is internal to changing material aspirations and a greater need for protection against the
uncertainty of migrant livelihoods. The child- and health-care services of the Catholic Church, tied to
religious education, are as necessary for the migrant Catholics to organise household care as it is for
the church to maintain the faith of their congregation and their local prestige.
Care for Sale: the Entanglements of the State and the Market
While the care provided by religious and other institutions is subjected to market forces, market
options are also not purely for profit. As we shall see, they are embedded in state institutions and
social relations, also seeking to sustain their operation through moral discourses of trust and care. At
times, they emerge from the hidden commercialisation of public services such as health care or
education; at other times, state institutions and agents facilitate the functioning of market actors for
their mutual benefits and efficacy. As consumers of these services, migrant households partake in the
multiple entanglements between the market, the state and social relationships.
During my fieldwork, life insurance salespersons had been frequenting the villages. Life insurance
companies are clearly aware of the potential for new customers in the district, where the migrant waste
trade has generated varying levels of wealth accumulation but is a risky business that can cause people
to incur sudden losses (Nguyen, in press). With premiums ranging from 3 to 20 million VND per year,
the companies can potentially target a wide range of migrant households with different incomes. Their
promotion methods include organising village workshops with the help of local leaders, who are
invited to attend training workshops at the companies’ headquarters, and sending agents to talk to
individual households. The sales agents recruited by insurance companies tend to be women based in
the rural areas, such as former Women Union cadres, who operate based on their rural networks.
Thanh’s accident and her ensuing death were thus good marketing opportunities for the Prudential
salespersons, who presented themselves as agents of a caring institution that has understanding for
such a tragic loss of life. Neatly dressed and eloquent, the two women expressed their sympathy to the
family, saying that they had explored all options as to whether they could help them, for example by
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backdating a policy, unfortunately without success. Then they made a persuasive presentation of the
life insurance policies offered by the company, stating that if Thanh had previously signed a contract,
her family would have received compensation that significantly offset her medical costs. By drawing
on the risks of migrant livelihoods, these agents effectively invoked the insecurity that potentially
creates a perceived need for what they were selling. Their introduction aroused much interest among
the villagers and the topic came up frequently in village conversations afterwards. Many were sceptical
of life insurance, especially regarding the requirement of regular payments over a long period. Yet I
also learnt that a wealthy household in the village had bought a policy, which suggests that it is likely
to become an option for better-off households.
While life insurance remains a costly commodity marketed by private companies that only higher-
income households consider, basic health insurance offered by the state has wider relevance. The
government plans to implement a universal health insurance system, which covers 68 per cent of the
population in 2013.13 The annual payments are covered by the employers, the state or the insured
themselves, depending on their income and employment status. In rural areas, except for members of
officially recognised poor households, children below the age of six, and beneficiaries of state welfare,
who are entitled to free health insurance, people are supposed to pay for the insurance as a voluntary
policy, which currently costs about 500,000 VND (about 25 USD) per person yearly. The basic
coverage of the insurance reduces the formal heath costs significantly, especially when one has to use
them for extensive treatments. The yearly premium may not be significant for better-off households,
but lower-income ones are reluctant to pay. In a richer village, almost all the households have bought
the heath insurance, whereas in the poorer village where I stayed, fewer have done so. My hosts would
rather save the money, buying cheap medication for self-treatment, and go to the church clinics if
necessary. That said, as soon as a severe chronic health problem is identified, they seek ways to
purchase the voluntary health insurance.
The reluctance to buy voluntary health insurance also stems from a mistrust in the public heath
system, which has differential quality and requires under-the-table payments (Ekman, Nguyen, Ha, &
Axelson, 2008). Most public hospitals operate extra services for those who can afford them, such as
private or semi-private rooms with better doctor consultation than the overcrowded wards common in
urban hospitals. When Mien’s husband came back from the provincial hospital, he told us many stories
about the bribes he and other in-patients had to pay in order to be properly treated. In his case, the
bribes had more than doubled the formal costs. The moonlighting of doctors from public hospitals is
another way in which the public health services have become commercialised. Since their services are
more personalised and trust-based, local people tend to see them for their health issues before
considering institutional treatment. For more serious problems, those who can afford it go to a private
hospital, preferring it to the public hospitals for its efficient and more straightforward services, which
do not require them to cultivate relationships (quan hệ) with the hospital staff. Meanwhile, doctors of
the private hospitals tend to work part-time in addition to being full-time employed in state hospitals.
Such practices suggest highly fluid boundaries between what is formal and informal, legal and illegal,
public and private provision of care.
Conclusions
Migrant households in Spring District pragmatically draw on a mix of care services, resources and
entitlements provided by the state, the market and social institutions to deal with the insecurity of their
migrant livelihoods. Their practices concurrently foster their belonging and membership to the rural
village and reinforce existing unequal power relations within it and beyond. Meanwhile, the operations
of these institutions of care do not merely indicate ‘reconfigurations of public and private’ (Read &
Thelen, 2007, p. 3) in market socialist Vietnam. They also betray a governing approach aimed at
producing subjects and communities who are self-governed and responsible for their own wellbeing
(Kaya, 2012; O’Malley, 2004).
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Abandoning the socialist principle of universal provision, institutions of care in post-reform
Vietnam largely operate on the basis of commodification or conditionality. These changing principles
of care provision are often disguised through moral discourses and community processes as the
institutions work through local networks of social relations. Market actors such as the life insurance
companies, while being primarily interested in profit, operate based on their locally embedded agents’
ability to market themselves as caring institutions that people can trust. While offering the spiritual
care that migrant households seek for their mobile livelihoods, religious institutions do not shy away
from demanding proper payments for their services, alongside their effort to exert discipline and
control. Social services are accessible only insofar as people look for them in the place of their
household registration and/or if they pay the proper fees. State social protection entitlements, limited to
the neediest and tightly capped to create local competition while being negotiable through community
processes, turn means-tested criteria into discussion of deservingness. In short, the commercial and
technical are transformed into the moral, thereby constructing the ideal subjects for market socialist
governance. As such, conditionality and commodification are constitutive of the moral authority that
state, market and social institutions of care seek to exercise in the new economy as they provide forms
of care with increasingly differential access.
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Notes
1. All names in the paper are anonymised.
2. The exchange rate at the time of writing is 21,000 VND to the US dollar.
3. He is referring to the common understanding that some form of future reciprocity is expected.
4. The commune is the lowest formal administrative unit in a hierarchy comprising the national, provincial, district and
commune levels. The commune is further divided into villages or hamlets whose governance structure is semi-formal, with
the village leaders mostly working on a primarily voluntary basis.
5. A defoliant used by the US military throughout the 1960s to expose North Vietnamese forces, potentially causing severe
health problems, including birth defects.
6. About 60–70 per cent of school children make it to the higher secondary level, after a relatively difficult entrance exam.
7. According to informants of my previous research from poorer localities, there are more conflictual negotiations over, and
abuses of, the Poor Household Status; for example, local leaders giving preferential treatment to their own relatives. In this
commune, where migrant livelihoods have increased the average local income, fewer households qualify under the official
criteria of having a monthly per capita income below 400,000 VND and having a temporary house.
8. The official population-planning policy in Vietnam set the limit of two children per family. Unlike China’s strict
implementation of the one-child policy, Vietnam’s enforcement of the two-child policy has been more flexible.
9. While Buddhism within Vietnam is organised through the state-sanctioned Vietnamese Buddhist Order, its membership is
less institutionalised than that of the Catholic Church. People who go to Buddhist pagodas do not necessarily classify
themselves as having a formal religious faith, as do the Catholics.
10. Có thờ có thiêng, có kiêng có lành, Vietnamese proverb.
11. According to traditional beliefs, the destinies of the children and parents (as those of husband and wife) are consequentially
interrelated, and this interrelation is shaped by whether their years of birth match each other or not.
12. See coverage of the Buddhist marriage ceremony at http://afamily.vn/doi-song/doc-dao-le-cuoi-cua-13-doi-uyen-uong-theo-
nghi-thuc-nha-phat-20130910054888.chn; http://vov.vn/MEDIA/Anh/Le-Hang-thuan-chuc-phuc-cho-cac-doi-vo-chong-tre/
280310.vov (accessed 21 February 2014).
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13. After four years of implementing the health insurance law, there are many adjustments to be made (Sau 4 năm thực
hiện Luật Bảo hiểm y tế: Nhiều nội dung cần được điều chỉnh), available at the website of the National Assembly:
http://duthaoonline.quochoi.vn/DuThao/Lists/TT_TINLAPPHAP/View_Detail.aspx?ItemID=1352 (accessed 4 February
2015).
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